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ABSTRACT
While it is evident that the ECtHR’s main task is applying the ECHR, it
is debatable whether the Court has adequate regard to general
international law when considering questions left open by the
ECHR. We contribute to this debate from a normative perspective.
We discuss the criticism that the Court unduly evades the ARSIWA
by applying an expansive positive obligations doctrine. We submit
that the Court’s propensity to focus on preventive obligations is
justified in substance, since it is difficult to imagine how human
rights could be effectively protected without such positive
obligations in a world where state, third state and private actors
mingle. In this sense, the Court’s jurisprudence makes valuable
contributions to the adaptation of the international legal system
to changing societies. Criticism should focus less on the Court’s
inclination toward positive obligations than on its pertinent
methodology, which is at times less than convincing.
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1. Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (the ‘Court’) has produced an extensive, fine-
grained and sophisticated jurisprudence, which covers diverse issues such as the right
to life, procedural guarantees and discriminatory practices.1 By doing so, the Court has
formed a distinct legal system,2 often referred to as ‘Convention law’. Yet, the Court’s prac-
tice of establishing a distinct legal system has been criticised from time to time on the
ground that the Court has ignored doctrines, principles and rules of general international
law3 to which it is bound. It is true that, in view of the magnitude of Convention law, it is
quickly forgotten that the Convention, as an international treaty, is part of the larger order
of general international law. As such, it is built upon and part of the framework of general
international law. Simply put, this means that the Court must have regard to and apply
general international law. To be sure, it is beyond question that the Court’s main
mandate, by force of general international law, consists in applying the Convention as
the primarily relevant source of law.4 However, the extent to which the Court is bound
to other – more general – sources of international law is less clear.5
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In particular, it is debatable whether the Court has taken adequate regard of, or rather
unduly evaded, general international law when considering questions left open by the
Convention and its Protocols. This article contributes to this debate from a normative per-
spective. In response to James Crawford and Amelia Keene,6 we discuss whether the
Court’s jurisprudence on positive and preventive obligations under Article 3 of the Con-
vention unduly evades the pertinent rules of general international law on state responsi-
bility. We argue that the criticised jurisprudence of the Court can largely be justified in
substance on the basis of the Court’s role as a protector of human rights. To start, in
section 2, we shall make some preliminary remarks on the normative question concerning
the applicability of general international law of state responsibility to human rights
regimes.7 We also explain why positive obligations to protect human rights are especially
interesting from the perspective of state responsibility. For reasons of space, we then make
our argument with reference to only a small number of judgments concerning positive and
preventive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. In section 3, we take up Craw-
ford and Keene’s criticism of the Court’s well-known El-Masri judgment.8 According to
Crawford and Keene,9 the Court’s approach to hold the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYRM; today North Macedonia) responsible for acts of another state on its
territory does not conform to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).10 In section 4, again drawing on the same case-law than
Crawford and Keene, we address his critique that the Court’s positive obligations doctrine
evades pertinent principles of the ARSIWA concerning the attribution of acts of private
actors.11 This part is thus based on exemplary judgments concerning child abuse at school.
The article concludes that the Court at times fails to apply the ARSIWA or applies them
in a methodologically unconvincing manner. However, the contribution shows that, to a
certain extent, the Court’s jurisprudence can be defended in substance on the basis of the
Court’s special role as a human rights guarantor. We offer a perspective different from the
one taken by some general international law scholars who criticised the Court’s judgments
that are discussed in this article. Arguing with the Court’s mandate to protect human
rights, we present a defence of its controversial preventive obligations doctrine.
2. International law on state responsibility and human rights
2.1. General remarks
We believe that there are good reasons to debate the relationship between human rights
regimes and general international law.12 Investigating this complex issue in its full
breadth is, of course, beyond the scope of this article. We limit our attention to a discus-
sion of selected judgments of the Court on positive and preventive obligations under
Article 3 in light of the rules on attribution and on assistance to another state’s commis-
sion of an internationally wrongful act contained in the ARSIWA.13 Certain peculiarities
of the Convention system (and human rights regimes in general) must be borne in mind
when assessing the practice of the Court in light of general international law and the
ARISWA in particular: unlike most traditional treaties, the Convention is not founded
on reciprocity14 but constitutes an objective legal order.15Not reciprocity guarantees com-
pliance with such ‘law-making’ treaty16 regimes, but individual complaint mechanisms.17
Human rights abuse may hardly be retaliated by violating others’ human rights.18 There
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are thus few reasons to control states’ countermeasures in responding to human rights vio-
lations19 through a general framework of state responsibility.20 Neither does the Conven-
tion system depend on external rules – if available at all – as regards questions concerning
compensation21 and the execution of the Court’s violation judgments. The Convention
itself addresses both22 and the Council of Europe established a sophisticated institutional
set-up for the implementation of the Court’s judgments.23
All of this is not to say that the ARSIWA in its entirety would be inapplicable or of no
added value to the Convention system or other human rights regimes. We merely suggest
that such peculiarities must not be neglected in discussions about the relationship between
a given treaty regime and general international law. Against this background, we put into
perspective the criticism according to which the Court’s jurisprudence on positive and
preventive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention dilutes or evades the rules on
attribution and assistance to another state’s internationally wrongful act contained in
the ARSIWA.24
2.2. Positive obligations to protect human rights and the ARSIWA
Positive obligations to protect human rights are especially interesting from the perspec-
tive of state responsibility because, as has been critically pointed out,25 they allow the
Court to leave unanswered difficult questions of attribution of harmful acts. Contrary
to negative obligations which prohibit harmful acts, thus requiring the duty-bearing
state to abstain, positive obligations require positive acts from that state.26 Positive obli-
gations of a preventive nature are aimed at the prevention of situations, such as human
rights violations.27 Breaches of negative obligations, obligations of result,28 are relatively
easy to identify: it suffices to establish that state action directly caused prohibited
harm.29 Difficulties may arise if the actor was not a de jure state organ but another
actor, whose action may be attributable to a state. Articles 4–11 of the ARSIWA
provide answers to the question when conduct is to be considered state conduct.30
Breaches of positive obligations, which may be either obligations of result or obligations
of conduct,31 take the form of unlawful omissions: some action that is required by inter-
national law was not done.32 Contrary to acts, which exist as factual incidents, omis-
sions do not materialise and are thus difficult to identify.33 The existence of an
omission depends on the identification of an abstract legal obligation that would
have required undertaking a certain action.34 In human rights practice, abstract positive
obligations are often quite unspecific, i.e. expressed in wide and vague in terms.35 Duties
to protect are often formulated along the lines of ‘Article… requires states to take
reasonable measures to ensure that individuals under their jurisdiction are not subjected
to… ’.36 It remains quite open and context-dependent whose abstention from what
action (i.e. which authority should have done what) constitutes an internationally
wrongful act by omission. This leaves human rights courts with considerable latitude,37
which enables them to largely pre-empt questions of attribution by interpreting and
specifying the pertinent positive obligation with hindsight to the effect that a de jure
state organ would have been obliged to take measures that were in fact not taken. In
cases where active and omissive conduct co-exist,38 this allows human rights courts
to leave questions of attribution of harmful acts open: if a court chooses to establish
state responsibility on the basis of a positive obligation according to which a de jure
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state organ unlawfully omitted preventive action, it may leave the question open
whether the act that directly caused the harm is attributable to the state.39 The state
is responsible for the human rights violation anyways.40
The case-law criticised by Crawford and Keene, and others and in part discussed below
shows that this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In certain cases, the Court overlooked
the question whether the act that directly caused the impugned harm was attributable to
the respondent state. Instead, the Court held the respondent state responsible on the basis
of positive obligations, arguing that a de jure state organ would have been obliged to adopt
certain preventive measures that this organ had in fact not taken. Such judgments evoke
the impression that the Court sometimes prefers solving cases on the basis of relatively
vague positive obligations over dealing with questions of attribution of acts. It is based
on such case-law that critics accuse the Court of evading the law on state responsibility
under the ARSIWA.
We will defend the Court, to a certain extent, on two grounds. On the one hand, we
argue with the mandate of the Court. It is the Court’s central task to effectively41
protect human rights in the light of present-day conditions42 by interpreting and applying
the Convention to that effect, even if this requires interpreting the Convention so as to
contain positive obligations.43 This normative proposition follows from the object and
purpose of the Convention.44 On the other hand, we argue with the technical distinction
between primary rules of international law, i.e. state obligations which are, amongst
others, enshrined in the Convention, and secondary rules of state responsibility contained
in the ARSIWA.45 The secondary rules of the ARSIWA are agnostic as to the content of
the states’ obligations under Convention law.46 That is, the ARSIWA constrain the Court
in no way in its interpretation and application of the Convention rights and the corre-
sponding negative and positive obligations of the Convention states. Therefore, if the
Court imposes (even far-reaching) positive obligations on the Convention states with
the effect of making otherwise difficult questions of attribution to some extent negligible,
this may be criticised on several grounds, but not as being tantamount to evading the
ARSIWA.
3. Duty to protect and third state responsibility in El-Masri
Though El-Masri raised many problems, we concentrate on how the Court answered two
questions relating to third state conduct in order to then analyse the Court’s approach
under the prima facie pertinent Article 16 of the ARSIWA.47
3.1. The Court’s approach to third state responsibility
First, the Court had to decide whether the FYRM could be held responsible for the appli-
cant’s ill-treatment at the hands of CIA agents at Skopje Airport, where he was forcefully
prepared for the subsequent secret rendition flight.48 In its own words, the Court had to
‘assess whether the treatment suffered by the applicant at Skopje Airport at the hands of
the special CIA rendition team is imputable to the respondent State’.49 As a general rule,
the Court had previously stated in vague terms: ‘Article [3] requires States to take
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected
to torture’50 and that ‘[t]he State’s responsibility may therefore be engaged where the
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authorities fail to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk of ill-treatment about which they
knew or ought to have known’.51 The Court concluded that it must regard the FYRM
‘as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory
with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities’52 because the impugned acts
occurred on its territory and in the presence of its authorities.53
Second, the Court had to decide on the FYRM’s responsibility for the applicant’s deten-
tion in a US dark prison in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Court
reiterate[d] that Article 5 of the Convention lays down an obligation on the State not only to
refrain from active infringements of the rights in question, but also to take appropriate steps
to provide protection against an unlawful interference with those rights to everyone within its
jurisdiction.54
The Court observed that officials of the FYRM ‘actively facilitated [the applicant’s] sub-
sequent detention in Afghanistan by handing him over to the CIA, despite the fact that
they were aware or ought to have been aware of the risk of that transfer’.55 As a result,
the Court held that the FYRM’s responsibility was engaged in respect of the detention
of the applicant in the US dark prison in Kabul.56
In effect, and even if it did not clearly say so,57 the Court thus seems to have attributed
to the FYRM both the ill-treatment at Skopje Airport and the detention of the applicant at
the hands of the CIA.58 Was this in conformity with general international law on state
responsibility?
3.2. Incompatibility with Article 16 of the ARSIWA
While the El-Masri judgment mentions the ARSIWA (namely Articles 7 and 14–16) in its
‘Relevant International Law’ section, it does not reference them again later. Instead, when
dealing with the attribution of the CIA’s acts to the FYRM, the Court referred to Ilaşcu and
Others v.Moldova and Russia,59 a case which concerned the attribution of acts of non-state
actors to Convention states.60 This cross-reference is misleading, though:61 broadly speak-
ing, the Ilaşcu situation (i.e. attribution of acts to a state, resulting in independent state
responsibility) is governed by Articles 4–11 of the ARSIWA,62 whereas Article 16
ARSIWA would apply to the El-Masri situation in abstracto (i.e. aiding or assisting
another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, leading to derived
state responsibility).63 Despite this deceptive reference to Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova
and Russia, the Court’s El-Masri judgment then seemingly relied on a rationale similar
to the one underlying Article 16 of the ARSIWA. However, the Court neither explicitly
nor implicitly based its findings on this provision64 – and for good reasons, Article 16
would not have applied in casu:65
For a start, the Court implicitly admitted that it was not competent to adjudge the US’s
actions.66 Hence, the Court could not determine whether the FYRM assisted in an inter-
nationally wrongful act per se, as would have been required by Article 16 ARSIWA.67 Fur-
thermore, Article 16 would have required that the FYRM intended to facilitate such an
international wrong by US authorities.68 Yet the Court, for its part, was satisfied that
the FYRM ‘ought to have known, at the relevant time, that there was a real risk that the
applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3’69 and ‘ought to have
been aware’ of the transfer into secret detention.70 This is not tantamount to having
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established intent to facilitate the impugned harm.71 Article 16 ARSIWA further requires
that ‘the internationally wrongful conduct is actually committed by the aided or assisted
State’.72 By contrast, the Court’s jurisprudence on removal contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention does not require that the feared harm actually occurred, but only demands
substantial grounds for believing that the person in question would face a real risk of
being subjected to ill-treatment.73 Dealing with the applicant’s detention in Kabul, the
Court applied the same standard to Article 5.74 In addition, the Court held the FYRM
responsible for the applicant’s ill-treatment and his subsequent detention75 – unlike
under Article 16 ARSIWA, which limits the assisting state’s responsibility to the wrong-
doing that its own conduct has caused or contributed to.76 With regard to this last
point, it could, however, be argued in favour of the Court that the FYRM’s assistance
was necessary for the US’s actions with the result that the resulting injury would be con-
currently attributed to the FYRM and the US.77
In sum, we agree with Crawford and Keene that Article 16 ARSIWA would not have
provided a legal basis for holding the FYRM responsible for injury resulting from the
impugned US acts.78 Nonetheless, the Court did so. By holding the FYRM responsible
not merely for its assistance to the US but for the US’s conduct, the Court, moreover,
seems to have exceeded the legal consequences foreseen by Article 16 ARSIWA: it see-
mingly attributed the US acts wholesale to the FYRM.
3.3. Violation of the duty to protect as conduct of state organs
The observation that the Court’s methodological approach to holding the FYRM respon-
sible for violations of the applicant’s substantive rights by US agents is not in conformity
with the rules of general international law on derived state responsibility raises questions
about other –more legally sound –ways to hold the FYRM responsible. This enquiry natu-
rally leads to an assessment of the conduct of de jure state organs of the FYRM, which is
clearly attributable to the state under Article 4 of the ARSIWA. As the commentary to the
ARSIWA says, there are numerous substantive (primary) rules that either prohibit a state
to aid or assist another state in the commission of certain internationally wrongful acts or
even require a state to prevent such acts.79
On the basis of such primary rules, the Court held the FYRM liable for its detention of
the applicant in a Skopje hotel80 and its transfer of the applicant to US agents.81 Both is in
conformity with the Court’s long-standing Soering jurisprudence82 and closely aligned
with Article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture.83 The Court also applies such inde-
pendent state responsibility84 on the basis of primary rules of Convention law in cases that
involve two Convention states. For instance, in Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and
Russia, the Court held that Georgia would violate Article 3 of the Convention if it extra-
dited the applicant to Russia because it could not be excluded that the applicant would be
ill-treated by Russian authorities.85 The Court therefore rightly held the FYRM responsible
for its detention of the applicant in a Skopje hotel and its handing over of the applicant to
US agents. Yet, on this basis, the FYRM can only be held responsible for harmful conduct
of its state organs.
Why did the Court not stop here, but impute the CIA’s brutal practices to the FYRM,
despite the lack of a legal basis in the law of state responsibility? The answer seems rather
clear with regard to the applicant’s ill-treatment at Skopje Airport: the Court did not want
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to leave unpunished a Convention state that was literally watching US special agents
torture and abduct innocent individuals on its territory. This becomes evident where
the judgment reads: ‘the acts complained of were carried out in the presence of officials
of the respondent State and within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the respondent State
must be regarded as responsible’.86 Legally, the Court’s reasoning is doubtful, however.
Jurisdiction, on the one hand, and attribution and state responsibility, on the other, are
distinct questions.87 One is left with the impression that the Court takes its mandate to
effectively protect human rights in Europe seriously by going far, sometimes too far, to
hold a state responsible88 if Convention rights are with its acquiescence violated on its ter-
ritory. This explanation of the Court’s practice is confirmed by the Court’s judgment in
Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan. This case concerned Armenian refugees, who were displaced
during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and have been denied return and access to their
property. The Court reasoned with ‘the need to avoid a vacuum in Convention protec-
tion’89 in order to hold that Azerbaijan had ‘full responsibility under the Convention’
due to its ‘jurisdiction as the territorial state’.90 Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction was presumed,
although the Court recognised that the Azerbaijani authorities ‘may encounter difficulties
at a practical level in exercising their authority’ in the area in question,91 which is in effect
no man’s land between the frontlines.92 Without further distinguishing between jurisdic-
tion and state responsibility,93 the Court applied positive obligations to hold Azerbaijan
directly responsible for the violation of several Convention rights.94 Could the Court’s
use of positive obligations in this case elucidate its decision to hold the FYRM responsible
for the applicant’s ill-treatment at Skopje Airport at the hands of CIA agents?
In view of the positive obligation of states under Article 3 of the Convention to protect
individuals under their jurisdiction from torture, the Court’s decision to hold the FYRM to
account for the applicant’s ill-treatment at Skopje Airport seems indeed justifiable, irre-
spective of whether the perpetrators were private or state actors.95 This is, moreover, in
line with the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s view in Alzery v. Sweden, which, referring
to Article 1 of the U.N. Convention against Torture, reads in the relevant parts: ‘at a
minimum, a State party is responsible for acts of foreign officials exercising acts of sover-
eign authority on its territory, if such acts are performed with the consent or acquiescence
of the State party’.96 We therefore submit that the Court’s El-Masri judgment should not
be read as attributing the applicant’s ill-treatment by US agents at Skopje Airport to the
FYRM. Instead, the judgment should be understood to the effect that the Court found
the FYRM directly responsible for breaching its positive obligation to protect individuals
under its jurisdiction from torture.97 At issue was a breach of a primary obligation by the
FYRM itself, not the attribution of CIA acts to the FYRM on grounds of secondary rules of
state responsibility. Admittedly, however, the Court’s reasoning and language is neither
entirely clear nor coherent.98
3.4. Unclear basis for the attribution of the applicant’s secret detention
The situation appears different with respect to the Court’s finding under Article 5 of the
Convention concerning the FYRM’s responsibility for the applicant’s secret detention in
Kabul. Here it is unclear which state duty was violated besides the FYRM’s positive obli-
gation to protect the applicant by not transferring him to US officials due to the substantial
human rights risks concomitant with this transfer. The Court’s judgment leaves this
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question open. This seems to imply that the Court indeed attributes the applicant’s four-
month detention in Kabul to the FYRM.99 The judgment does not explicitly say so,
however;100 neither does it elucidate the reasons or the legal basis for such an attribu-
tion.101 The Court simply justifies its finding with the FYRM’s active facilitation of the
applicant’s detention and the ensuing human rights risks.102 André Nollkaemper thus
aptly criticised the Court for not clarifying how this charge differs from the violation
that resulted from the applicant’s initial transfer to US custody.103
3.5. Summing-up
According to James Crawford and Amelia Keene, the Court is ‘broadening… the rules on
the responsibility of a third state for violations carried out on its territory but not by it’ and
‘develop[ing] its own jurisprudence on State responsibility for conspiracy, or “conni-
vance”, in a way which has no basis in the ARSIWA’.104 He likened this to ‘expanding
the substantive obligations of the ECHR to avoid engaging with the ARSIWA’.105 The
foregoing analysis leads, in part, to a different result: the Court’s conclusion that the
FYRM violated Article 3 in the context of the applicant’s ill-treatment at Skopje Airport
is to be understood as a finding of a breach of a state duty to protect106 which is generally
recognised in international human rights law.107 This reading of El-Masri is supported by
a passage in the related Al Nashiri judgment where the Court held that ‘Poland was
required to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within its jurisdiction
were not subjected to torture’.108
The situation is, admittedly, different with regard to the Court’s finding on Article 5 of
the Convention. This part of the judgment can be criticised for its lack of clarity concern-
ing the basis on which the FYRM was held responsible for the applicant’s detention in the
US dark prison in Kabul. It must be emphasised, though, that the Court seems to have
moved away from this jurisprudence. In Al Nashiri, Poland was held responsible for
enabling the US authorities to transfer the applicant to Morocco only, and not for his sub-
sequent detention in Rabat.109 In El-Masri, the Court seems to have overreached in its – in
principle laudable – efforts to avoid vacuums of human rights protection in Europe when
it held the FYRM responsible for what happened in Kabul. After all, the Court would
obviously not even have had jurisdiction with regard to the applicant’s detention in
Afghanistan.110
4. Attribution and positive obligations under Article 3
As El-Masri shows, the Court is walking a tightrope between the application of recognised
positive obligations to protect, on the one side, and inadequate attribution of conduct, on
the other. This has led to the critique that the Court confounds attribution and positive
obligations.111
4.1. Untangling criticism of the Court’s positive obligations doctrine
4.1.1. No primacy of negative obligations
We argue that those miss the point who criticise the Court for drawing on positive obli-
gations instead of dealing with questions of attribution that arise from harmful actions by
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actors other than de jure state organs. This needs some explanation.112 Imagine a case con-
cerning a private school teacher who whipped a pupil in a manner amounting to ill-treat-
ment under Convention law. Roughly speaking,113 the Court can focus on two issues: on
the action that directly caused the alleged harm (i.e. the whipping) or on some omission
that made the harmful action possible or more likely (i.e. the lack of some preventive
measure against whipping). The first issue requires the Court to deal with the question,
governed by the ARSIWA, whether the whipping can be attributed to the state. If the
Court examines the second issue this is different insofar as it is not factually clear who
omitted. Contrary to acts, omissions cannot be traced back to a certain actor. Omissions
presuppose duties to act, which are assigned based on normative criteria and often only
loosely defined in the abstract. The resulting latitude allows the Court to not deal with
the conduct of private or parastatal actors but to concentrate on whether de jure state
organs bore and omitted a duty under Convention law to take effective preventive
measures. By doing so, the Court may find a state responsible for the harm suffered by
the pupil irrespective of whether the whipping is attributable to the state. This is legally
unproblematic because negative and positive state duties as well as active and omissive
state conduct may co-exist and co-apply.114 The ARSIWA have nothing to say on how
the Court must approach such a case. Breaches of primary obligations are exclusively gov-
erned by Convention law. It is thus perfectly compatible with the ARSIWA if the Court
finds a state in breach of a positive obligation without dealing with a possible breach of
a negative obligation (and the accessory question of attribution).115 Also, there is no
rule according to which the Court would have to prioritise negative over positive
obligations.116
Those who criticise the Court for expanding positive obligations in order to evade ques-
tions of attribution, however, suggest that negative obligations should be treated as a pri-
ority to positive obligations. Otherwise, the Court’s practice would not be objectionable
given that – as explained – the ARSIWA do not compel the Court to apply or prioritise
negative obligations. This conception would mean that the Court should follow a sequen-
tial approach. First, it would have to examine whether injurious acts are, according to the
ARSIWA, attributable to the respondent state.117 If they are, the state is considered as
having actively interfered with the applicant’s rights and, thus, as having violated its nega-
tive obligation, e.g. under Article 3 of the Convention. Conversely, if the injurious act
cannot be attributed to the state, the Court could in a second step examine whether the
state omitted to comply with a positive duty that required the state to prevent injurious
acts. But, as explained, the ARSIWA is agnostic to the content of primary rules and, as
a consequence, also to the question how negative and positive obligations interrelate
under Convention law.
Besides this technical argument based on the distinction between the secondary rules of
the ARSIWA and the primary rules of Convention law, we believe that it is also norma-
tively wrong to suggest that the Court should, as a rule, primarily focus on negative obli-
gations. It is the Court’s mandate, as it emerges from the object and purpose of the
Convention, to effectively protect human rights. This may require the Court to focus
on positive obligations; namely, in cases where a focus on omissive state conduct is
better suited to grasp the main human rights problem. We come back to this below.
For the above reasons, we submit that the criticism against the Court’s positive obli-
gations jurisprudence under Article 3 is, albeit not entirely misplaced, framed wrongly.
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If the Court’s substantive positive obligations jurisprudence is to be critically assessed, this
cannot be done on the basis of the ARSIWA. Rather, it must be asked if the Court’s
interpretation and application of positive obligations under Article 3 is too expansive in
light of general international human rights law and/or if it lacks the necessary methodo-
logical rigour.
4.1.2. Re-focusing on the Court’s methodology
We assume that those who take issue with the Court’s approach of sometimes focusing on
positive obligations do not mean to say that a Convention violation entailing state respon-
sibility is excluded if the injurious act cannot be attributed to the state; that is, when no
breach of a negative state duty was found. State responsibility, as explained, may
equally be engaged by the failure to comply with positive obligations.118An omission com-
plained of is often clearly attributable to the state,119 notably where an applicant invokes
the omission of genuine state functions such as to legislate,120 to investigate and prosecute
or to take preventive security measures to maintain public safety and order.
Therefore, the Court’s propensity to focus, in certain constellations, on the failure to
comply with positive obligations rather than on the attribution of injurious acts is not pro-
blematic as such. Three questions, all predominantly governed by primary rules, must be
asked to assess the Court’s practice: (1) Does the alleged positive obligation exist under
Convention law and is it permissible under general international human rights law? (2)
Did the state indeed omit its obligation? (3) Is the omission sufficient for finding a Con-
vention violation under the applicable test concerning the causation between omission and
harm?121 The Court’s focus on positive obligations in a given judgment can only be said to
be improper either if the Court answers at least one of these questions in a manner incom-
patible with general international law, or else if the Court’s assessment of the case is meth-
odologically tainted.
This leads to the observation that the debate presumably concerning the perceived
obliteration of attribution and positive obligations actually concerns rather the Court’s
positive obligations doctrine than the Court’s dealings with attribution. By reference to
two Article 3 judgments that James Crawford and Amelia Keene criticised,122 the follow-
ing section examines, by way of examples, whether the Court’s positive obligations doc-
trine is unduly expansive or lacks the necessary methodological rigour.
4.1.3. Positive obligations under Article 3 in light of general international human
rights law
The first question to be addressed is whether the Court creates positive obligations under
Article 3 that go too far in light of general international human rights law. This, we would
argue, cannot be claimed easily. In Costello-Roberts v. UK, a case dealing with moderate
corporal punishment of a pupil, the Government accepted its obligation to legislate in a
general sense. It argued, however, that it had fulfilled its duty by outlawing all but mod-
erate forms of corporal punishment.123 Whether this was sufficient under Convention
law was clearly a question to be answered by the Court, though. The Court challenged
the respondent state’s view,124 referring to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child.125 The U.N. Convention establishes, in Article 28, a state duty to ‘take appropriate
measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the
child’s dignity and in conformity with the present Convention’. Today, it seems that the
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Court’s approach – to require legislation that prohibits all forms of corporal punishment –
would be at least defensible in view of the quoted Article 28 and the relevant General
Comment No. 8.126 In 1993, Costello-Roberts was perhaps ahead of its time. Yet it must
not be forgotten that the ‘existence and development of international law depends on
the application, reinforcement and enforcement of international law’ through bodies of
its special regimes.127 It would be wrong to assume that the Court may only follow suit
after the Human Rights Committee or the International Court of Justice (which undeni-
ably play important roles in the international legal system) have taken a step in developing
an international rule.128
In O’Keeffe v. Ireland,129 which dealt with 20 sexual assaults on a nine-year old pupil by
a Diocese schoolteacher, the Court examined Ireland’s positive obligation to take legisla-
tive measures to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction are not subject to ill-treat-
ment contrary to Article 3. It justified this obligation by pointing to its earlier
jurisprudence in X and Y v. the Netherlands130 and by arguing that only effective crim-
inal-law provisions backed up by law-enforcement could achieve deterrence against
such grave acts.131 The Committee against Torture’s relevant General Comment No. 2
also discerns a state duty ‘to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute
and punish such non-state officials or private actors’ that ill-treat individuals contrary
to the U.N. Convention against Torture.132 Again, the Court’s general approach seems
at least defensible under general international human rights law.
4.1.4. Difficulties with assessing compliance with positive obligations
The second and third questions to be dealt with ask whether the Court erroneously or
lightly concludes that a respondent state failed to comply with its positive obligation
even if said obligation is far from clear, and whether the Court’s assessment as to
whether an omission is sufficiently linked to rights infringements to engage state respon-
sibility lacks the necessary methodological rigour.
In Costello-Roberts, there was no need to address these questions at length. The Court
found that the corporal punishment inflicted upon the applicant remained under the
minimum level of severity required to claim a violation of Article 3.133 The judgment’s
wording is, however, ambiguous where it reads ‘the State cannot absolve itself from
responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies’ and that ‘[a]ccordingly…
the treatment complained of although it was the act of a headmaster of an independent
school, is none the less such as may engage the responsibility of the United
Kingdom’.134 This sounds as if the Court would then proceed to assessing the act of cor-
poral punishment, yet this passage marked the end of the Court’s considerations of the
positive state duty to take legislative measures to secure the rights of schoolchildren.
The Court could have been more precise: the present formulation leaves some room for
interpretation as to whether the Court dealt with a positive state duty or with the attribu-
tion of an active interference with the applicant’s rights.
In O’Keeffe, it remains unclear how exactly the Court reached its conclusion that
Ireland failed to take the required measures to prevent the sexual assaults. According to
the Court: ‘the question for current purposes [was] whether the State’s framework of
laws, and notably its mechanisms of detection and reporting, provided effective protection
for children attending a national school against the risk of sexual abuse’.135 The Court later
observed that Ireland should have been aware of the pertinent risks and failed to address
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 967
them ‘through the adoption of commensurate measures’.136 These, the judgment suggests,
‘should, at a minimum, have included effective mechanisms for the detection and report-
ing of any ill-treatment by and to a State-controlled body, such procedures being funda-
mental… to the fulfilment of the positive protective obligation of the State’.137 This leaves
the scope and the content of Ireland’s positive obligation largely unresolved. It would be
commendable if the Court specified the pertinent positive obligations – at least for the
purpose of a given case – in greater detail in order to carefully subsume the respondent
state’s relevant legal framework.138 Because a Convention violation means responsibility
for an actual impairment of someone’s Convention rights, it would furthermore be
most desirable if the Court adopted a rigorous test to assess the linkage between state
conduct (i.e. the omission) and the result (i.e. the rights infringement). This linkage
takes an important function in that it limits state responsibility for infringements of Con-
vention rights that were not actively caused by the state. Thus, this linkage has a function
similar to the role that attribution of conduct of non-state actors plays at the level of sec-
ondary obligations:139 limiting state responsibility to the purview of the state.140
In O’Keeffe, the Court did not apply any clear methodological test to assess the link
between the sexual assaults and Ireland’s omission. While it makes clear that the state
should have monitored the schools more closely, the Court fails to state what would
have been required and, by extension, what Ireland exactly omitted.141 The Court empha-
sised, though, that the applicant, who had been obliged to attend school, had no reasonable
alternative other than the school where she was assaulted.142 This indicates that the Court
undertook some causality consideration. It seems to have opined that Ireland, by obliging
the applicant to go to school but not providing an alternative to the school where she was
assaulted and by failing to take effective preventive measures, bore some responsibility for
the assaults. With regard to the last element, i.e. the failure to establish an effective pro-
tective framework, the Court argued based on foreseeability. It stated that Ireland ought
to have known of the risks and the need for preventive measures.143
This reminds the reader of El-Masri, where the Court argued that the applicant’s secret
detention was foreseeable and that the FYRM laid the ground for the later US acts.144 The
fundamental idea appears to be that a state has violated its duty to protect: if, first, the
human rights violation complained of was or should have been foreseeable; and,
second, if the omitted measures had or might have prevented the violation. Yet a system-
atically applied, methodologically sound test seems to be absent.145 As Stoyanova observes
concerning the proximity (causality) between the harm and the state omission: ‘the Court
uses different expressions in order to refer to the causation between the harm and any
omissions… the Court has not developed anything close to a consistent terminology…
uncertainty pervades the case law’.146 This is problematic since it negatively affects the
comprehensibility and persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning.
4.1.5. Effective human rights protection: focus on systemic problems
Given these difficulties with defining the scope and content of positive obligations and
establishing the causal link between an omission and rights infringements, one could
argue that the Court would better focus on negative obligations – even if that requires
dealing with questions of attribution. Establishing an active interference with Article 3
is normally much easier than assessing whether the failure to comply with a positive obli-
gation led to a Convention violation. Likewise, it is easier to define injurious acts to refrain
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from than to define preventive measures to adopt. However, attributing active interfer-
ences of non-state actors to the state may raise complicated problems too. Apart from
such practical concerns, other highly important issues need to be considered as far as
the focus on negative or positive obligations is concerned.
Against the background of the cases discussed, one such consideration quite naturally
comes to mind: namely, that, in certain cases, positive obligations capture the main human
rights problemmuch better than a focus on active interferences.147 Insisting on the duty to
protect may be much more effective. This might explain the Court’s approach. For it is,
after all, the Court’s main purpose to effectively protect human rights. Ideally, however,
the Court would not focus on positive obligations to neglect negative obligations, but in
order to fully assess the active and omissive conduct attributable to a state.148
In O’Keeffe and Costello-Roberts, teachers at independent schools interfered with the
physical integrity of pupils who were required by law to attend school. Moreover, the
pupils’ parents were, in the former case, not given any real choice between different insti-
tutions149 and, in the latter case, not adequately informed of the private school’s use of
corporal punishment contrary to state school practice.150 In cases like these, focusing
on negative obligations means dealing with the act of an individual who is at best at the
periphery of the respondent state. Whether the individual’s act can be attributed to the
state under the ARSIWA does not change much. Does the establishment of a formal attri-
butive relationship to the state in order to make the fictitious claim that the state itself
actively interfered with the applicant’s integrity really matter? Is not the question as to
the state’s positive obligations much more important for the purpose of fine-tuning dom-
estic human rights systems and thus ensuring effective protection of human rights
throughout Europe?151 It is a fiction to believe that the state is a unitary entity that violated
someone’s Convention rights either by acting or omitting. It is perfectly possible that a
state teacher actively interfered and that, at the same time, central state organs omitted
to take adequate preventive measures. If that is so, one may wonder if it would be appro-
priate for an international human rights court to focus more closely on the fallible indi-
vidual than on the sloppy state system.152
Considering O’Keeffe again, the main problem was, in any case, not the individual,
criminal act of the teacher, whatever his status.153 What was crucial was the malfunction
of the state – the failure of high-level authorities. They were, or ought to have been, aware
of the problem of sexual abuse.154 But they neither abandoned the system of entrusting
obligatory primary school education to denominational institutions nor put in place
effective control mechanisms.155 From the perspective of a human rights court, what
must follow is clear. To effectively protect human rights, the Court must focus on the
more general problem: the omitted state duty to generally protect schoolchildren from
sexual abuse by means of reasonably effective measures. Tellingly, the Court’s approach
is fully supported by the opinion on positive obligations adopted by the Human Rights
Committee.156
Furthermore, it must not be forgotten what might happen if human rights courts took a
very cautious approach to positive obligations. Should human rights courts principally
refrain from imposing preventive obligations on states, state duties could be evaded rela-
tively easily by merely outsourcing public interests far enough to break any chain of formal
attribution. Private schools, private prisons, private security forces, private debt collectors
and private health care providers already exist.157 It is difficult to believe that it would be in
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conformity with the object and purpose of the Convention, or indeed any human rights
treaty, if the Court would turn a blind eye to such institutions’ human rights records.158
4.2. Summing-up
To be sure, the Court does often not examine whether acts committed by non-state actors
can be attributed to the state under the ARSIWA. The Court, when referring to attribution,
certainly often fails to apply the ARSIWA, or does not apply them rigorously. And, no
doubt, the Court is not always entirely clear as to whether it is dealing with attribution
or positive obligations.
In our view it is defensible, however, for an international human rights court to focus
on positive obligations if it is evident that this is where the crucial, systemic deficit lies.
This is in line with the idea of fine-tuning the domestic human rights systems of Conven-
tion states. Moreover, it is consistent with the Human Rights Committee’s view. Most
importantly, it corresponds with the Court’s main responsibility, which is to effectively
protect human rights in Europe.
Nevertheless, the Court’s pertinent case-law is weak on methodology.159 Occasionally,
its language is ambiguous. The scope of positive obligations under the Convention is at
times hardly discernible, and the Court does perhaps not always delineate positive obli-
gations in line with standards under general international human rights law. Finally,
the Court’s jurisprudence could be improved in terms of introducing a clear and consist-
ently applied test to examine whether an omission resulted in a Convention violation. All
this leads, now and then, to judgments that are difficult to reconcile with the relevant doc-
trines of general international law. These doctrines may, as a consequence, be negatively
impaired or – put another way – diluted.160
5. Conclusion
We propose the following answer to the question posed in this article’s title: with regard to
the issues addressed here, the Court’s focus on positive obligations can be justified in sub-
stance. Methodological imperfections – albeit unavoidable – are, however, not justified:
they are regretful not only because they are capable of diluting doctrines of general inter-
national law, but also because a lack of methodological rigour may, in the long term,
damage the Court’s own authority.
With regard to the Court’s positive obligations jurisprudence, three important con-
siderations must be borne in mind: first, Convention law is a special regime containing
primary obligations that must not necessarily be identical to those under another treaty
regime or customary international law. For the present purpose, this means primarily
that it is the responsibility of the Court, as the authoritative interpreter of the Convention,
to construe the Convention guarantees in their negative and positive facets. In particular,
the ARSIWA, as a non-legislative codification of secondary rules on state responsibility, do
not pertain to this interpretative act. In short, primary and secondary rules are to be care-
fully distinguished. Second, the Court’s relatively strong emphasis on positive obligations
is justified by the heightened importance of preventive and protective duties in the human
rights context. In today’s complex, globalised world, where state, parastatal, non-state and,
possibly, third state actors mingle, it is difficult to imagine how human rights could be
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effectively protected without protective state duties. This ratio does not, however, demand
an either/or approach. The Court could and should, despite a certain focus on positive
obligations, also examine breaches of negative obligations, even if this means solving ques-
tions of attribution according to the ARSIWA. Third, the international legal system con-
tinues to steadily develop, and so do its legal rules. The Court’s case-law contributes to this
process. Therefore, while the Court’s sometimes-progressive jurisprudence may, from
time to time, be too far-reaching, it ultimately contributes to the continuous adaptation
of the international legal system to changing societies. The other side of the coin is that
the Court must be careful not to confuse doctrines of general international law by
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